Scalar implicaure is often off ered as the exemplar of generalized conversational implicature. However, despite the wealth of literature devoted to both the phenomenon in general and to specifi c examples, little attention has been paid to the various factors that may infl uence the generation and interpretation of scalar implicatures. Th is study employs the "Literal Lucy" methodology developed in Larson et al. (in press) to further investigate these factors in a controlled experimental setting. Th e results of our empirical investigation suggest that the type of scale employed aff ects whether or not speakers judge a particular scalar implicature to be part of the truth-conditional meaning of an utterance. Moreover, we found that features of the conversational context in which the implicature is situated also play an important role. Specifi cally, we have found that the number of scalar values evoked in the discourse context plays a signifi cant role in the interpretation of scalar implicatures generated from gradable adjective scales but not other scale types. With respect to the eff ects of scale type, we have found that gradable adjectives were less frequently incorporated into truth-conditional meaning than cardinals, quantifi cational items, and ranked orderings. Additionally, ranked orderings were incorporated less than cardinals. Th us, the results from the current study show that the interpretation of scalar implicature is sensitive to both the associated scale type and discourse context.
Introduction
Scalar implicature is the most frequently discussed type of conversational implicature, owing in large part to the regularities that hold across all examples of the phenomenon. However, despite the wealth of literature devoted to this particular type of implicature, little attention has been paid to the various factors that may infl uence the generation and interpretation of scalar implicatures. Th is study employs the methodology developed in Larson et al. (in press ) to investigate the diff erences they found across various types of scalar implicatures. Larson et al. concluded that speakers do not treat all scalar implicatures alike with respect to their inclusion in truth-conditional meaning. For example, implicatures associated with gradable adjectives were less frequently judged to aff ect truth-conditional meaning than those that enrich cardinal numbers from an "at least" to an "exactly" reading. Th e current study presents empirical evidence that further investigates and extends these fi ndings, showing that not only does the type of scale aff ect the interpretation of scalar implicatures but also that certain contextual features aff ect whether or not speakers judge a particular scalar implicature to be part of the truth-conditional meaning of an utterance.
Generalized Conversational Implicatures
Within Grice's framework (Grice, 1967 ) , a speaker's communicated meaning consists of what is said and what is implicated . What is said corresponds to the truth-evaluable propositional content of an utterance, while what is implicated corresponds to additional aspects of speaker-intended meaning beyond what is said . Conversational implicatures arise from the assumption that speakers are behaving cooperatively by attempting to further the ends of the discourse through their co-participation. Speakers succeed in communicating more than what they literally say through the observation and violation of conversational maxims, i.e. ways of adhering to Grice's Cooperative Principle. Generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs) are calculable according to these conversational maxims and hence are not purely conventional but nonetheless exhibit a high degree of regularity. GCIs are general in the sense that they arise under normal circumstances unless something in the context prevents or "blocks" their generation.
As additional, pragmatically-conveyed meaning, conversational implicatures for Grice may be cancelled . Th at is, since conversational implicatures are by defi nition not part of truth-conditional meaning, they may be denied by the speaker in a subsequent remark without contradiction (e.g. "but I don't mean to suggest that…"). Th e cancellability feature that Grice attributed to all conversational implicature has been challenged by a number of authors. Th ese "Post-Gricean" authors (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1986 ; Recanati, 1993; Carston, 2002 ) have argued that many of the examples classifi ed as GCIs by Grice and "Neo-Griceans" (e.g. Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000 ) are in fact not cancellable and, hence, are part of truth-conditional meaning. While they maintain a distinction between saying and implicating, Post-Griceans reject the Gricean claim that what is said is determined by pre-pragmatic processes. For them, there are pragmatically-determined aspects of truth-conditional meaning extending well beyond the few examples recognized by Grice, such as indexical and pronoun resolution. Th e issue here concerns where to draw the line between saying and implicating. For Grice, what is said is determined by the conventional meaning of the words a speaker utters, while what is implicated is determined by additional pragmatic factors. Th e PostGriceans, on the other hand, deny that there is a level of meaning corresponding to what is said that is pre-pragmatic. Instead, under this view, pragmatics "intrudes" upon truth-conditional meaning, rendering some of Grice's GCIs truth-conditional and not in fact genuine implicatures.
1
In a Gricean framework, scalar implicatures are all derived from Grice's fi rst Maxim of Quantity: "Make your contribution as informative as required" (Grice, 1967 : 26) . Th rough observing this maxim, a speaker may implicate that additional information is false (or unknown) because they have not provided a more informative response.
2 Th e notion of information employed by this maxim can be understood as an ordering of values on a scale, which ranks the informativeness of values in a descending order. An utterance employing a stronger value on such a scale provides more information than a similar utterance using a weaker value. Scalar implicatures are generated when a speaker selects a weaker value on the scale, thus implicating that stronger values on the scale are false. In examples (1)-(3) below, a speaker's use of the (a) sentence will in normal circumstances implicate that, according to the scale in (d), the corresponding (b) sentence is false. Th us, the scalar value in each of the (a) sentences licenses the inference to the corresponding (c) sentence.
(1) a. Gus ate some of the cake.
b. Gus ate all of the cake. c. Gus did not eat all of the cake. d. <all, some> (2) As discussed in Horn ( 1972 Horn ( , 1984 and Gazdar (1979) , scalar implicature involves the ordering of scalar values according to an entailment relation. If a sentence containing a stronger value on the scale is true, this will entail the truth of a corresponding sentence with a weaker scalar value substituted. In example (3) above, the informationally stronger claim that John bought three books entails the truth of the weaker claim that he bought two. Th is entailment relation orders the scale and specifi es the relation between the values on the scale. Implicatures arising from modals ( <must, can> ), defi nites/indefi nites ( <the, a> ), logical connectives ( <and, or> ), and others can be treated likewise within this framework. Hirschberg ( 1991 ) provides an account of scalar implicatures that extends to cases in which an entailment relation doesn't hold among scalar values. It had been previously noted that conventional rankings, such as legal classifi cations (tort, misdemeanour, felony, capital crime), which are not ordered on the basis of entailment relations, can also generate scalar phenomena. For example, if a company policy states that people convicted of a misdemeanour are not eligible for hire, then one is licensed to infer that people convicted of a felony are not eligible as well. Hirschberg develops the notion of a partially ordered set, or poset , in order to account for scalar phenomena more generally, of which entailment-based scales are but one instance. If a set of linguistic expressions can be ranked according to some metric which orders alternate values as higher or lower, a poset can support scalar implicatures, provided that the ranking metric is salient to both speaker and hearer. Th is broader notion of a partial ordering allows for not only orderings that do not support entailments but also for orderings that are much more context-or domainsensitive, as in (4) Here, what makes the exchange coherent is the world knowledge that Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt are partners and thus form a poset of individuals. Whether scales are defi ned by posets or by an entailment relation, however, they all share the property of having their values ordered with respect to some salient metric.
Experimental Approaches to GCIs
Previous experimental work has been largely concerned with cognitive and developmental questions about the processing of implicatures. While important for furthering our understanding of implicature phenomena, such experiments have shed little light on where to draw the line between saying and implicating. Th e few studies that have attempted to address whether speakers incorporate implicatures into truth-conditional meaning (Gibbs & Moise, 1997 ; Nicolle & Clark, 1999 ) have suggested that speakers often treat implicatures as aff ecting truth-conditional meaning. Th ese studies, however, suff ered from various methodological problems, such as instructions that assumed familiarity with technical terminology. To address these issues, Larson et al. (in press ) identifi ed an experimental paradigm in which participants were trained to interpret target items from the perspective of a literal-minded person, named Literal Lucy. Th is training was designed to give participants consistent criteria for the task, focussing on truth-conditional meaning rather than on what the target sentence could communicate more generally. Th ey found that participants were less likely to judge implicatures to be part of truth-conditional meaning when using Literal Lucy's perspective to guide their judgements. In addition to developing a new paradigm to address where the line between saying and implicating should be drawn, Larson et al. also investigated a wider variety of GCI types than had been previously explored. Rather than focussing on a small number of standard examples, they employed stimuli that refl ected a much wider range of diff erent GCI types. On the whole, participants in these studies treated GCIs as distinct from semantic entailments as well as from other pragmatically determined elements of truth-conditional meaning, such as deixis and ellipsis. However, within the category of GCIs, there was considerable 3 In the U.S. university system, there are typically four categories of students: freshmen (fi rst year), sophomores (second year), juniors (third year), and seniors (fourth year). variance in terms of the frequency with which the implicatures were incorporated into truth-conditional meaning. Th is eff ect was the most pronounced for the four types of scalar implicatures stimuli, exemplifi ed in (5) Of these four types, cardinals were most frequently judged to aff ect truthconditional meaning (75%), followed by ranked orderings (49%), quantifi ers and modals (33%), and gradable adjectives (12%). Th e large degree of variance among these types of scalar implicatures was unexpected and not predicted by any current theory of scalar implicature. To draw any clear conclusions, however, a greater number of stimuli would be necessary for statistically valid comparisons across scale types. Th e goal of the current study is to explore which factors might explain the observed variance in the frequency with which scalar implicatures are incorporated into truth-conditional meaning. A more frequent incorporation into truth-conditional meaning could be a result of features associated with the scale itself. As Larson et al. themselves observed, diff erent scale types are associated with diff erent mean rates of incorporation. For example, they found that participants were more likely to exclude stronger, yet logically consistent, scalar values for cardinals than, say, for gradable adjectives.
An additional possible factor aff ecting the incorporation of scalar implicatures into truth-conditional meaning is the relative salience of alternate scalar values. While it has been recognized that there is a role for salience in the interpretation of scalar implicature (Hirschberg, 1991 ; inter alia) , the factors that contribute to the salience of scalar values have not been adequately investigated. Th e more salient the alternate values on a scale are, the more likely a speaker may be to draw the inference that stronger values on that scale are false. A likely factor aff ecting the salience of scalar values is whether alternate scalar values have been explicitly evoked in context. Consider (10) , in which the discourse context explicitly introduces alternate scalar values not evoked in (9). Sam: Lisa has three children.
In (10), Sam has chosen not to respond with one of the stronger scalar values evoked by Irene's question. Given that alternate values were explicitly evoked in this context, and are therefore salient, this increased salience may result in a greater likelihood that the corresponding implicature would be incorporated into truth-conditional meaning. In what follows, we describe the experiment that we designed to investigate these factors.
Methods

Materials
Th e materials used in this experiment consisted of short conversations between two characters, Irene and Sam. In these written conversations (presented on a computer screen), Irene asks Sam a question and Sam answers it. After his answer, information that is relevant to the conversation, and which the participants are told is true, appears (labelled "FACT" 4 To investigate the eff ects of discourse context on participants' judgements, we created three versions of each conversation, each of which contained a different number of values on a given scale: no values evoked (N) , one value evoked (O) , and multiple values evoked (M) . For example, in the (N) version of an experimental conversation, Irene would evoke the relevant scale but none of the scale's members, as in (12). In the (O) version, Irene would mention one member of the scale, as in (13), while in the (M) version, Irene would mention several members of the scale, as in (14). In the (O) condition, Irene's question always included a member of the scale that was stronger than that used in Sam's response. Th is is illustrated in (15) Examples of each of these types can be found in Appendix B.
Design
Th e experiment included 48 scales, each of which was used in a diff erent conversation. For each conversation, there were three versions, one for each of the discourse context conditions ((N), (O) , and (M)) described above, resulting in a total of 144 experimental items. Each participant read only one of these versions for each conversation, so each participant saw 48 experimental items in all. For example, a participant might have read the (N) version of the conversation for the < 3, 2, 1 > scale, the (O) version of the conversation for the < 6, 5, 4 > scale, the (M) version of the conversation for the < all, most, some > scale, etc. Experimental, control, and fi ller items were grouped using a Latin Square design, resulting in 12 experimental scripts. Each script contained 12 blocks of four experimental items and four control/fi ller items. Th e order of items within the blocks and the order of the blocks themselves were randomised, so no two participants read the same combination of conversations in the same order. In this paper, we analyse a subset of the scales included in the experiment: ten cardinals, eleven gradable adjectives, fi ve ranked orderings, and six quantifi cational items, resulting in 32 scales in total. 
Participants
Forty-eight native speakers of North American English drawn from the Northwestern University community participated in this experiment. Th irty participants were recruited through fl yers posted on campus and were paid for their participation, and 18 participants were recruited from introductory Linguistics classes, receiving course credit for their participation. No participants reported any language impairments other than one minor speech impediment, which was corrected through therapy. Th e mean age of our participants was 20; 14 were males, 34 were females.
Procedure
Participants were given instructions introducing them to Literal Lucy, a literal-minded character who interprets everything literally and, thus, misinterprets instances of non-literal language, such as fi gurative language and indirect speech acts. We used the Literal Lucy character to evoke participants' folk notion of "interpreting literally" while avoiding relying on technical terminology. Our use of the Literal Lucy character also induced a shift in perspective that focussed participants on a sentence's truth-conditional meaning, rather than having them rely on their own interpretation of what the speaker may have been trying to communicate. Participants were introduced to Literal Lucy's particular way of interpreting language through examples like (17), in which Literal Lucy demonstrates her tendency to attend only to the conventional meaning of the words uttered.
(17) Example of Literal Lucy's interpretation of fi gurative language
Frank: Brian just had a birthday, and I didn't realize how old he was. Lucy: Really? How old is he? Frank: He just turned 40, so now he's over the hill. Lucy: Hill? Which hill? And when did he go over it?
In (17), instead of interpreting the idiom over the hill idiomatically (i.e. "past one's prime"), Literal Lucy interprets it literally (i.e. "over some particular hill"). After demonstrating how Literal Lucy interprets utterances, we instructed participants to adopt her way of interpreting language when evaluating the truth of statements in the experimental task. Each conversation was followed with "Given this FACT, Literal Lucy would say that the underlined sentence is: T or F.", which served to remind participants to respond as Literal Lucy would. Th is question was followed by a four-point Likert Scale, on which participants rated their confi dence in their answers. Participants performed the tasks on a computer in a sound-attenuated booth using a self-paced reading methodology.
Results
Analysis
Statistical analyses of the participants' true and false responses were carried out using linear mixed-eff ects logistic regression models with participants and items as random factors. Th is type of analysis avoids spurious eff ects that can arise when proportion data are analysed using traditional ANOVAs (Jaeger, 2008 ) . In our linear regressions, when a factor (i.e. an independent variable) has multiple levels, one is selected as the reference level, and all other levels are compared to it within a model. Analyses were carried out in R, a programming language and environment for statistical computing (R Development Core Team, 2008 ).
Comparison of Scalar GCIs to Contradictions and Entailments
We fi rst built two models to determine whether responses for the four scalar GCI types diff ered from those for contradictions and entailments. Recall that the FACT for the scalar implicature items was designed to contradict the implicature licensed by Sam's utterance. So, if a scalar implicature item patterned like the contradiction control items -in which the FACT contradicts Sam's utterance -then the implicature was taken to be incorporated into the truth-conditional meaning of the utterance. On the other hand, if a scalar implicature item pattered like the entailment control items -in which the FACT entails Sam's utterance -then the implicature was taken to be distinct from truth-conditional meaning. Our fi rst model, Model 1, had item type (cardinals, quantifi cational items, ranked orderings, gradable adjectives, contradictions, entailments) as the only fi xed eff ect and used entailments as the reference level, thereby comparing entailments to the four scale types and contradictions. Model 2 also had item type as the only fi xed eff ect but used contradictions as the reference level, so it compared contradictions to the four scale types and entailments. Th ese models showed that both contradictions and entailments signifi cantly diff ered from all four scale types and from each other (p<0.001).
8 Th e percentages of false responses for the four experimental scale types and the two types of control items are illustrated in Figure 1 .
Eff ects of Scale Type and Discourse Condition
Our next set of models examined diff erences across scale types and discourse conditions and the interactions between them. After conducting a preliminary analysis of the data, we built a full model (Model 3) with scale type, discourse condition, and their interaction as fi xed eff ects, using gradable adjectives as the scale type reference level and (N) as the discourse condition reference level. Th e full model was compared to three simpler models using likelihood ratio tests, which compare how well the models fi t the data. Th ese comparison models were: Model 4 -only scale type as a fi xed eff ect, Model 5 -only discourse condition as a fi xed eff ect, and Model 6 -scale type and discourse condition as fi xed eff ects, with no interactions between them. 9 Model 3, 9 Models 4-6 had the same reference levels as Model 3. with both discourse condition and scale type as well as their interactions as fi xed eff ects, fi ts the data signifi cantly better than the three comparison models. 10 Model 3 shows a signifi cant diff erence between the (N) and (M) discourse conditions and signifi cant diff erences between the gradable adjective scale type and the cardinal, quantifi cational, and ranked ordering scale types. Finally, this model, taking gradable adjectives and (N) as the reference levels, shows signifi cant interactions for (M) and the three other scale types.
11 Th e percentage of "false" responses for the four scale types in each of the three discourse conditions are illustrated in Figure 2 .
Th e signifi cant diff erences we observed between scale types and discourse conditions, as well as the signifi cant interactions found in the full modelcoupled with the fact that this model signifi cantly outperformed models without discourse condition, scale type, and their interactions as fi xed (O) , and (N)) in the four scale types (cardinals, quantifi cational items, ranked orderings, and gradable adjectives). A higher percentage of "false" responses indicates that the implicatures associated with a category were more often included in truth-conditional meaning.
eff ects -led us to explore these eff ects more fully with a series of additional models. We fi rst examined the discourse condition eff ect for each scale type individually. We built a pair of models for each of the four scale types, for a total of eight models, with discourse condition as the only fi xed eff ect. Th e fi rst model in each pair had (N) as the reference level and the second model had (M) as the reference level. Th e relevant results from all eight of these models are summarized in Table 4 , found in Appendix C. Only gradable adjectives showed signifi cant diff erences between the discourse conditions: Th e (M) discourse condition diff ered signifi cantly from the (O) and (N) Our fi nding that the (M) condition diff ers from the other two conditions for gradable adjectives alone raises the question of whether gradable adjectives in general license scalar implicatures in the absence of multiple scalar values being evoked in the context. To address this question, we built a model that only compared entailments to gradable adjectives in the (N) discourse condition. If entailments and gradable adjectives in the (N) discourse condition patterned the same, it is possible that scalar implicatures are not generated for gradable adjectives when no scalar values are mentioned in the context. However, entailments were signifi cantly diff erent from gradable adjectives in the (N) discourse condition (Estimate: -0.9169, Std. Error: 0.4027, z-score: -2.277, p<0.05), suggesting that our gradable adjective stimuli in the (N) condition, at least sometimes, generated implicatures.
In order to determine the overall diff erences between the four scale types, we used a set of three models with diff erent scale type reference levels. Each model had scale type, discourse condition, and their interaction as fi xed eff ects. Th e relevant results from these models are summarized in Table 5 , found in Appendix C. Most of the scale types were highly signifi cantly diff erent from one another (p<0.001); however, quantifi cational items were only marginally signifi cantly diff erent from cardinals and ranked orderings (p<0.1). Given that discourse condition had a signifi cant eff ect for only one scale type (gradable adjectives), we conducted an additional analysis on scale types in the (M) condition -the condition that evoked the greatest number of scalar values and thus, presumably, rendered the relevant scale most salient in context. We built a model using only items in the (M) discourse condition. Th is model had only scale type as a fi xed eff ect, with gradable adjectives as the reference level. Gradable adjectives were still signifi cantly diff erent from quantifi cational items and cardinals (p<0.01), while gradable adjectives and ranked orderings were not signifi cantly diff erent from each other (p>0.1). Th ese results are summarized in Table 6 , found in Appendix C.
Discussion
Th e results from this experiment reveal two interacting factors that aff ect the interpretation of scalar implicature. Th e fi rst of these is the number of scalar values evoked in the discourse context, but this factor does not aff ect our four scale types uniformly. Recall that we manipulated the context by varying the number of scalar values evoked, ranging from none to one to multiple alternate values evoked (our (N), (O) and (M) conditions, respectively). However, varying the context in this way aff ected truth value judgements only for gradable adjective items.
For gradable adjectives in the (N) condition, where Irene's question did not evoke multiple scalar values, participants' responses were diff erent from the pattern of responses found in the entailment controls, indicating that the participants were at least sometimes incorporating the implicature into the truthconditional meaning. However, in the (M) condition, in which multiple scalar values were evoked in Irene's question, the frequency with which the implicatures were incorporated increased signifi cantly. Th is fi nding suggests that the interpretation of implicatures associated with gradable adjectives, in contrast to those associated with the other scale types, is infl uenced by the number of scalar values evoked in the preceding context.
To explain the more frequent incorporation in the (M) condition, we note that Sam's response containing a weaker scalar value was used in contrast to a stronger, more informative alternate value already explicitly evoked in the context. Th is eff ect suggests that the interpretation of gradable adjectives shifts from being only weakly scalar in the absence of a contrast with other scalar values, to being more strongly scalar when the context favours a more informative interpretation, i.e. one in which stronger values do not hold. In the other discourse conditions, Sam's utterance could more readily be interpreted as not making a claim that a stronger scalar value was false because there was no explicit contrast among alternate scalar values.
While discourse condition played a signifi cant role in the interpretation of gradable adjectives, it did not aff ect the interpretation of the other scale types: the response patterns in the (N), (O) , and (M) conditions for cardinals, quantifi cation items, and ranked orderings were not signifi cantly diff erent from each other. Th at is, for these types, the number of scalar values evoked in Irene's question did not aff ect the frequency of incorporation into truthconditional meaning. Even in the (N) and (O) conditions, where Sam's response did not select between explicitly evoked stronger and weaker scalar values, participants nonetheless judged Sam's utterance similarly to when a contrast was established. Th e interpretation of gradable adjectives, on the other hand, was more sensitive to the explicit evocation of multiple scalar values.
Th e immunity of cardinal, quantifi cational, and ranked ordering scales to the eff ects of discourse condition suggests that alternate values on these scales enjoy a greater degree of salience -once the scale has been evoked -than those on gradable adjective scales. Th e greater salience of alternate values on these three scale types can be explained by considering that their values are more closely associated with the other values on the scale, such that mentioning the scale or a value on that scale is more likely to evoke alternate values. Such an association follows from the relative domain independence of the lexical items used to refer to scalar values. For example, the relation between some and most is essentially domain-independent; that is, this relationship holds whether applied to atoms, books, or zebras. Th e same holds for cardinals and ranked orderings. However, stronger values on gradable adjective scale are domainrestricted. For example, hot is a shared value across temperature scales but stronger values are lexicalised diff erently in diff erent domains, e.g. sweltering (atmospheric temperature), sizzling (food), scalding (liquids), or burning up (humans with a fever). Th us, once the scale is evoked, the values on the cardinal, quantifi cational, and ranked ordering scales are inherently salient, resulting in no eff ect of discourse condition on the likelihood of incorporation into truth-conditional meaning.
Th e restriction of certain lexical items to particular domains, however, cannot fully account for the frequency with which an implicature is judged to impact truth-conditional meaning. To see why this is so, we must consider the second factor that aff ects the interpretation of scalar implicature, namely scale type. We found two main signifi cant diff erences among scale types: ranked orderings were incorporated into truth-conditional meaning less often than cardinals, and gradable adjectives were incorporated less than all other scale types.
To explain the fi rst of these fi ndings, we note that an important diff erence between our ranked ordering and cardinal stimuli was that all of the ranked orderings were presented in modal contexts that strongly favoured the "at least" interpretation. For example, one of our ranked ordering stimuli included the following modal statement by Sam: "Juniors can register for the advanced seminar", which licenses the inference that seniors can register for it as well. Given that all scalar values are associated with both "at least" and "exactly" interpretations, the relevant issue is which factors lead participants to favour one over the other. Under the "exactly" interpretation, which in our experiment corresponded to the incorporation of the implicature into truth-conditional meaning, higher scalar values are semantically excluded and therefore cannot constitute part of what is said . In non-modal contexts, on the other hand, ranked orderings strongly disfavour the "at least" interpretation and therefore we did not use such contexts in our stimuli. For example, the values corresponding to the conventional sizes of mattresses (< king, queen, full, twin >) do not lend themselves readily to the "at least" interpretation in a non-modal context: e.g. when John says that he bought a twin size mattress, he asserts, in the absence of special circumstances, that the mattress he bought is not a king size. However, in a modal context, such as discussing which size mattress can fi t into a certain room, both interpretations are available: e.g. if a queen mattress can fi t in a certain room, a king mattress may be able to as well.
Another possible reason for the diff erence between ranked orderings and cardinals in their frequency of incorporation into truth-conditional meaning is the way the stimuli for the two scale types were constructed. Th e FACTs for the ranked ordering stimuli were written in such a way as to make reference to sets of values rather than to a specifi c higher scalar value. We did this because, as noted above, the "exactly" interpretation for ranked orderings is generally favoured and the FACT needed to capture all weaker scalar values to overcome this preference. For example, in (18) below, reference to a very large room in the FACT conveys that any size mattress will fi t in the guest room.
(18) Irene: Will a twin, full, queen, or king mattress fi t in the unfurnished guest room? Sam: A full mattress will fi t in the guest room. FACT: Th e unfurnished guest room is as big as a two car garage.
In the context of (18), the FACT does not pick out any particular scalar value; rather, any scalar value on the relevant scale would be true. Th at is, what is relevant in our ranked ordering stimuli is that the entire set of values, rather than one specifi c scalar value, is inferrable from the FACT. In the cardinal stimulus provided in (19), on the other hand, the FACT does pick out one specifi c scalar value, i.e. four.
(19) Irene: Does Lisa have two, three, four, or more children?
Sam: Lisa has three children. FACT: Lisa has quadruplets.
Th us, the relative infrequency of incorporation for ranked orderings, as compared to cardinals, can be further explained because the FACT picks out a set that includes the value in Sam's utterance. Th e more inclusive FACT for this scale type encourages the "at least" interpretation of Sam's utterance, which resists the incorporation of the corresponding implicature. Our second scale type fi nding was that implicatures associated with gradable adjectives are less frequently incorporated into truth-conditional meaning than all other scale types. Values on gradable adjective scales share with cardinal and quantifi cational scales the property of entailing weaker values, e.g. something being hot entails that it is warm. However, they diff er from cardinal and quantifi cational scales in diff erent ways. On the one hand, gradable adjectives are unlike cardinals because gradable adjectives, like quantifi cational items, have vague boundaries. For example, the boundaries of hot on the temperature scale are much less clear than the boundaries of three on the cardinal scale. On the other hand, unlike quantifi cational scales, gradable adjective scales have no upper bound. For example, there is no maximally loud volume (on the gradable adjective scale of loundness), but no student can attend class more often than always (on the quantifi cational scale of frequency). Th e combination of vague boundaries and a lack of an upper bound permit lexically unmarked, non-maximal values to range indefi nitely higher, without excluding stronger scalar values. Th is means that the values on gradable adjective scales tend to be interpreted non-exclusively, e.g. a hot day may be a felicitous description of a sweltering day, while Many people had a good time is generally an infelicitous description of everyone having a good time. Scalar values that are interpreted less exclusively are correspondingly less likely to favour the "exactly" interpretation. Th erefore, scalar implicatures associated with gradable adjectives are less likely to be incorporated in the truth-conditional meaning of utterances containing these values.
One way to increase the exclusivity of scalar values for gradable adjectives is by evoking multiple scalar values in context by using them in contrast with one another, as in our (M) condition. Recall that implicatures associated with gradable adjectives in the (M) condition were signifi cantly more likely to be incorporated into truth-conditional meaning than those in either the (O) or (N) condition. However, even in the (M) condition, when they were most likely to be considered part of truth-conditional meaning, participants nonetheless incorporated them signifi cantly less often than cardinals and quantificational items, which had higher rates of "false" responses. Th is shows that even when used in a context that encourages an interpretation exclusive of stronger values, gradable adjective implicatures are not incorporated into truth-conditional meaning as often as the other implicature types.
Th ese explanations of our fi ndings assume, broadly speaking, that a greater frequency of incorporation into truth-conditional meaning corresponds to a more frequent generation of implicatures or to an increase in the strength of the implicatures generated. Under this assumption, a higher rate of "false" responses, when participants judged that the implicature impacted truthconditional meaning, indicates that the implicature was generated more often or was stronger than in the cases where the percentage of "false" responses was lower. While it is clear that an implicature was generated in cases where it was incorporated into truth-conditional meaning, this experimental paradigm cannot distinguish between cases in which an implicature was generated and subsequently cancelled, and cases in which an implicature was not generated at all. A further online experiment is needed to distinguish between these cases and to assess the extent to which discourse context and scale type impact the generation and subsequent interpretation of scalar implicature. Th e results from the current study do show, however, that the interpretation of scalar implicature is sensitive to both the associated scale type and discourse context. Table 2 . Parameter values for the fi xed eff ect item type in a mixed logistic regression model of True/False responses, in log odds, and associated standard errors, z-scores, and probabilities. Th e scale types adjectives, cardinals, quantifi cational items, and ranked orderings, and the control type entailments are compared to the reference level contradictions. Table 4 . Parameter values for the fi xed eff ect discourse condition in mixed logistic regression models of True/False responses, in log odds, and associated standard errors, z-scores, and probabilities. Th is table summarises the relevant comparisons from eight regression models. Two models were created for each scale type (adjectives, cardinals, quantifi cational items, and ranked orderings) to allow comparisons between the three discourse conditions ((M) , (N) , and (O) 
